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This study proposed a theoretical framework for analyzing farm capital structure choice. The theoretical 
model recognizes that the costs of debt are endogenously determined which in turn reflect the degree of 
credit constraint faced by individual borrowers. Based on the proposed model, we derived the impacts of 
different determinants on capital structure choice analytically. The theoretical inferences are further tested 
with  empirical  data.  Methodologically,  we proposed  a  fixed-effect  quantile  regression  procedure  to 
estimate the impacts of determinants at different ranges of leverage. The effects of determinants are 





























In the finance literature different theories have been proposed to explain firm capital structure choice. The 
theories include the tradeoff theory (Miller, 1977), pecking order theory (Myers, 1984), agency theory 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and market timing theory (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). Given the corporate 
focus of this literature, few of these theories can be directly applied to the farm business setting, as farm 
businesses  are  fundamentally  different  from  corporate  firms  in  many  aspects  and  farmers  may  have 
different patterns of decision making (Guan and Oude Lansink, 2006). In the agricultural economics 
literature  Collins  (1985)  and  Barry,  Baker,  and  Sanint  (1981)  proposed  an  expected  utility  model 
(hereafter referred as Collins-Barry model) for analyzing optimal capital structure choice. In the Collins-
Barry model the capital structure (debt ratio) is a decision variable and the optimal debt ratio is found 
when the farmers’ expected utility is maximized. The impact of different factors on the choice of capital 
structure can then be analyzed and tested. The utility maximization model provides a useful tool for 
empirical  capital  structure  analysis  and  is  widely  accepted  in  the  literature.  However,  the  empirical 
evidence is not always in agreement with this model (Ahrendsen, Collender and Dixon, 1994). 
The Collins-Barry model is an unconstrained utility maximization model. Without accounting for credit 
constraint, the model implicitly assumes that farmers have full access to credit. However, credit constraint 
is common in farm businesses due to the absence of equity market, a substantial lag between the purchase 
of inputs and the sale of outputs, and undiversified and inflexibly held capital (Bierlen et al., 1998). There 
are some theoretical studies investigating capital structure choice under credit constraint. Robison and lev 
(1986) examined the effects of various forms of credit constraint on borrowing behavior and found that 
they can explain the “go for broke” phenomenon that arises from a willingness to incur greater financial 
risk as the proprietary firm’s survival is threatened. Robison, Barry, and Burghardt (1987) extend the 
previous work to examine the effects of financial stress and limitation of liability on borrowing behavior. 
Compared  to  the  Collins-Barry’s  unconstrained  model,  these  studies  focus  on  the  extreme  case  of 
financial stress where farms are constrained by strict credit limit. Instead of the two extreme, special 4 
 
cases, it is more common that farms are faced with differing degrees of credit constraint, which calls for a 
generalized capital structure model.     
In the existing literature there are only some ad hoc studies investigating the effect of credit constraint on 
farmers’ capital structure decision (Barry et al., 2000; Bierlen et al., 1998). In these studies, a common 
issue is how to proxy credit constraint. The existing studies simply groups data using criteria of age and 
the credit score (Barry et al., 2000), or business cycle (Bierlen et al., 1998) to reflect the degree of credit 
constraint in different groups and examine the effect of one or several farm attributes on capital structure 
decision. The grouping approach in the literature may not correctly capture credit constraint and therefore 
result in incorrect conclusions. In addition, grouping data is likely to create a sample selection problem in 
terms of econometrics. 
The limitations in theory and methodology clearly point to the need of further research. The objective of 
this study is twofold, both theoretical and methodological. Theoretically, we propose a generalized farm 
capital  structure  choice  model  applicable  to  differing  degrees  of  credit  constraint.  We  develop  an 
optimization model that takes account of credit constraint. The model provides a general conceptual 
framework for analyzing factors that affect farm capital structure decisions. We use the cost of borrowing 
as a constraint in the utility maximization model. We argue that the differing cost of borrowing among 
borrowers is endogenous and provides an ideal proxy for the degrees of credit constraint in the light of 
credit risk evaluation conducted by lenders when approving loans and determining the interest rate. Based 
on  this  generalized  model,  impacts  of  different  determinants  of  farm  capital  structure  are  derived 
analytically and further tested empirically. Methodologically, we propose to use quantile regression to test 
the theoretical results. Quantile regression can evaluate the varying effects of explanatory variables on 
dependent variables when the dependent variable takes on values in different ranges. Use of the quantitle 
method  avoids  spurious  regression  and  sample  selection  problem
1. We further employ Chamberlain 
(1982)  and  Mundlak  (1978)  approach  to  addressing  the  potential  heterogeneity  and  allowing  for 
                                                 
1 Koenker and Basset (1978) indicate that it is the faulty notion that something like quantile regression could be achieved by 
segmenting the response variable into subsets according to its unconditional distribution and then doing least squares fitting on 
these subsets. 5 
 
correlation between explanatory variables and the farm-specified effect, which constitutes an additional 
methodological contributions of this work.   
 
Collins-Barry Model  
The Collins-Barry model assumes that farmers maximize the expected utility of the rate of return on 
equity capital
2 when making capital structure choice. If incorporating the tax shield from depreciation, the 
extended Collins-Barry model would take the following form:              
 1                                                            γ  E =




                                                       = [(r0τ  (1 + δ) − uDδ)] 1 − φ  + pφ(1 + δ)] 
 
where γ  E is the stochastic rate of return to equity. A is total asset. E is total equity. D is total debt. The 
leverage  ratio  E D/   . r0  is  the  ratio  of  the  previous-period  earnings  before  interest,  tax,  and 
depreciation (EBITD) to total assets. τ   denotes growth index of return, which is defined as one plus 
growth rate. The index is the stochastic, with mean uτ and variance ˃τ
2,  D u is the interest rate charged by 
lenders, assumed to be exogenous. p is the assets depreciation rate, and   is exogenously determined 
ordinary tax rate.  
The expected rate of return on equity is  
 2                                                                   E γ  E  = [(r0uτ(1 + δ) − uDδ)] 1 − φ  + pφ(1 + δ) 
 
The Variance of γ  E  is  
 3                                                                     Var γ  E  = r0
2(1 + δ)2(1 − φ)2˃τ
2 
The  variance  of  the  rate  of  return  on  equity  is  the  total  risk  farmers  have  to  face,  which  can  be 
decomposed into business risk r0
2(1 − φ)2˃τ
2 and finance risk (1 + δ)2.  
                                                 
2 Collins (1985) considers that a focus on return to assets is not appropriate for a proprietorship, because there is no reason to 
expect capital structure to affect the rate of the return on assets (before interest) except in the extreme case. Meanwhile, he 
excludes maximizing the market value of the debt and equity in respect that efficient markets for the equity do not exist. 6 
 
Assuming a negative exponential  utility function and a normal  distribution of the stochastic 
variable, Freund (1956) demonstrated that the expected utility-maximizing solution may be obtained by 
maximizing the certainty equivalent of return on equity with respect to leverage ratio:  
 (4)                              max
                                                       δ
 E U γ  E    = max
δ
 CE γ  E   = max
δ
[E γ  E  −
1
2
ˁVar(γ  E)] 
                          = max
                                             δ
 [(r0u











where U(∙) is utility function and ˁ is the Arrow-Pratt measure of farmer’s absolute risk aversion. 
By rearranging the first-order necessary condition for maximizing the expected utility, optimal leverage 
ratio is 
 5                                                δ∗ =
(r0uτ − uD) 1 − φ  + pφ
ˁr0
2(1 − φ)2˃τ
2 − 1 
 
The second-order condition holds if the proprietor is risk averse. 
Comparative static analysis shows that risk-averse level ( ), volatility (
2
  ), and interest rate ( D u ) are 
negatively related to optimal leverage ratio, while expected growth index (  u ) and depreciation rate (p) is 
positively  related  to  leverage.  The  previous-period  rate  of  return  on  assets  ( 0 r )  has  an  ambiguous 
relationship with leverage. The comparative static results imply that farms with high depreciation rate 
may issue more debt, which is inconsistent with the argument in the corporate finance literature. In the 
corporate firm setting, the tax shield of debt can be substituted with non-debt corporate tax shield, such as 
depreciation deductions. Ahrendsen, Collender and Dixon (1994) attribute the positive effect to the major 
difference between corporate firms and farms: access to equity markets. Because of the lack of access to 
equity markets,  farmers  often  select scale  and capital structure  simultaneously: farm with more  fixed 
assets should also have more debt.  
 
The Generalized Model 7 
 
Cost of debt and credit constraint  
 
Collins (1985) assumes that the cost of debt (i.e. interest rate) is exogenous, constant, and independent of 
leverage ratio. The assumption is reasonable in the macroeconomic context as the equilibrium interest rate 
is determined by market supply and demand. However, in the microeconomic environment, the interest 
rate  charged  by  lenders  is  time-variant,  stochastic,  and  endogenously  determined  by  farm/operator 
characteristics. In the agricultural credit market, lenders generally set the interest rate according to 
the degree of the borrower’s creditworthiness. Lenders usually use professional tools, such as the 
default probability model (or credit evaluation model), to evaluate the risks associated with loan 
applications. The default probability model
3 is used in loan approval decision and to price loans. 
Farmers with a higher default probability will be charged  a higher interest rate. Hence, the rate 
offered by lenders embodies information on the credit risk and the degree of credit constraint of 
farmers.  
When the credit risk reaches a certain threshold, the bank would reject the offer even if borrowers would 
offer to pay a high interest rate. This means un-clearing market, which is inconsistent with the classical 
price theory. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) attribute it to negative adverse selection and incentive effects: an 
increase in the rate of interest causes adverse selection, since only borrowers with riskier investments will 
apply for a loan at a higher interest rate. Similarly, higher interest payments create an incentive for 
investors to choose projects with a higher probability of bankruptcy. Thus some borrowers would not 
receive a loan even if they offer a high interest. This can be illustrated in figure 1.  
Figure 1 shows interest rate faced by farmers.  0 i  is the minimum interest rate at which most 
banks charge their best customers, who in general have little credit risk. With an increase in the 
default probability, the lender would charge a higher interest rate for the additional risk till the 
                                                 
3 In the past decades, greater precision in credit evaluation of agricultural borrowers has occurred. 8 
 
default probability reaches the threshold ? (i.e., the maximum risk the lender would bear) 
4, at 
which point the lender stops supplying loans, however high the interest rate is offered. At the 
threshold, a complete constraint occurs, and farmers are blocked out of the credit market. This is 
equivalent to having an infinite interest rate 
We propose to use the endogenously determined cost of debt as a generalized form of credit 
constraints. We will further incorporate this into a utility maximization model as a constrai nt. 
The general cost of debt model and PD relationship is developed as:  
 6                                              ?? =
∅
ω− 𝑃?
+ ?              0 ≤ PD ≤ ω ≤ 1 
 
where   is the opportunity cost of debt. The random term ? reflects uncertainty in future costs and 
availability of credit. 
Default Probability Model 
 
The default probability affects the cost and availability of debt. Most of the default probability models are 
based on the application of statistical classification techniques to the relevant loan customer attributes in 
order to assign them to various risk groups, reflecting their relative creditworthiness (Chhikara, 1989). As 
a major parametric classification technique, logistic model is often used in the literature.  As the default 
probability threshold is limited to ω by banks, the model form is specified as: 
 7                                                    𝑃? =
???
1 + ??? 
 
where x  is a vector of factors representing the farm’s characteristics, and   is a vector of coefficients. 
The  credit  evaluation  literature  suggests  five  traditional  characteristics  that  affect  farmers’ 
creditworthiness, which are five C’s: Capacity, Capital, Collateral, Character, and Conditions. Capacity 
refers to a borrower's ability to repay a loan obligation which is often proxied with performance.  
                                                 
4 In general, the maximum risk level banks can bear is exogenous to farmers. It depends on banks’ efficiency, risk 
management level, and asset adequacy rate and so forth.  9 
 
Capital is gauged by a firm's capital composition or financial position with an emphasis on risk 
ratios (e.g. capital structure). Collateral is the level of assets securing a loan. Character relates to 
borrowers’  personal/demographic  characteristics.  Conditions  reflect  general  economic 
environment that affect  a borrower's ability to repay.  Sonka, Dixon, and Jones (1980) conclude 
lenders are responsive to the borrower’s financial position in terms of the amount of the loan approved. 
Barry et al. (2000) consider three factors in credit analysis: repayment potential, expected returns and 
risk-bearing ability. When evaluating the creditworthiness of a borrower, agricultural lenders focus on 
relatively few variables (Gustafson, 1989). In our study, we include three financial indicators and four 
characteristics in the model. They are leverage ratio ( ), tangible asset ratio (Tang), profitability (?0), 
farm size (Size), involvement of family member (Fami), non-farm income (Nfi) and legal organizational 
form of farm (Form). Then 
 8                        ?? = ?1? + ?2?𝑎?? + ?3?0 + ?4?𝑖?? + ?5?𝑎?𝑖 + ?6𝑁?𝑖 + ?7???? 
 
Leverage ratio is a measure of capital composition. A priori, it is positively related to credit risk (i.e., 
?1>0) as high leverage deceases the net value of the farm and increases the difficulty of repayment. 
Tangible ratio is a measure of collateral and, obviously, is inversely related to the probability of default 
(?2<0). Profitability is a good measure of capacity. Higher profitability implies higher capacity to repay 
the loan and interest (?3<0). Farm size is considered as a proxy for agency cost between farm proprietors 
and banks. Large farms are more closely watched by lenders and have larger bankruptcy cost, which 
would discourage farmers’ willingness to default. Consequently, a negative effect of farm size on default 
probability is expected (?4<0). The degree of family members’ involvement in the business presumably 
influences the farmer’s risk perception. More family participation may make farmers more careful with 
the decision making and make them more motivated to run the business efficiently in order to have a 
secure livelihood for the whole family (?5 < 0). Non-farm income serves as buffer for farm income loss 
and can increase farmers’ debt service ability and therefore reduce the credit risk (?6 < 0). Lenders also 10 
 
judge farmers’ credit risk based on the legal status of farm. In contrast to limited liability of corporate 
firms, family farms are most organized as sole proprietorship and assume full liability. Even in limited 
partnership form, at least one of partners has to have full responsibility for liability.  
After the PD model is substituted back into the cost of debt model, the cost of debt is a function of a set of 
farm/operator attributes: 
 9                                         ?? =
∅(1 + ???)
? + (? − 1)??? + ? 
 
Utility Maximization Model  
Costs of borrowing include a random element ? which reflects risks from exogenous random shocks. The 
expected cost of debt is  
 10                                           ?(??) =
∅(1 + ???)
? + (? − 1)??? 
 
Assume a variance of ?𝑖
2 and covariance is ˃iτ with the return on assets. The expression for expected 
utility maximization becomes 





τ(1 + δ) −
∅(1 + ???)





















Differentiating the new objective function with respect to the leverage ratio results in the following first 
order condition: 
 12                               r0uτ −
∅ 1 + ??? 
? + (? − 1)??? −
∅????1
[? +  ? − 1 ???]2 δ  1 − φ  + pφ 
 
                                                   −ˁ(1 − φ)2 r0
2˃τ
2 − r0˃iτ  − ˁ(1 − φ)2δ r0
2˃τ
2 − 2r0˃iτ + ?𝑖
2  = 0 
 
Define ?2 = r0
2˃τ
2 − 2r0˃iτ + ?𝑖
2and derive the second order condition 
 
 13                −  
2∅????1
[? +  ? − 1 ???]2 +
∅????1
2[? +  1 − ? ???]
[? +  ? − 1 ???]3 δ + ˁ(1 − φ)
2?2  < 0 11 
 
 
The second derivative is negative when  ?1 < 0, in which case the utility is maximized. 
Write the FOC as  
 
 14               ? ?,?  =  r0uτ −
∅ 1 + ??? 
? + (? − 1)??? −
∅????1
[? +  ? − 1 ???]2 δ  1 − φ  + pφ 
                                                   −ˁ(1 − φ)2 r0
2˃τ
2 − r0˃iτ  − ˁ(1 − φ)2δ?2 
 
 
where k represents all the determinants (?,?,?,r0,uτ,˃τ
2,˃iτ,?𝑖
2)  that influence leverage. When the FOC 
holds, deriving and rearranging the total differential of (14) yield  
??
?? = −
?? ??  
?? ??   . Since less than zero, the 
effect of attributes on leverage is determined by the sign of ?? ??   .  
Comparative static properties of the first order condition are 
 




r0 1 − φ 
?? ??  
> 0 
 





?? ??   > 0 
 




(1 − φ)2 r0
2˃τ
2 − r0˃iτ  + (1 − φ)2δ?2
?? ??  
< 0 
 





2ˁ(1 − φ)2(1 + δ)
?? ??   < 0 
 
When default probability approaches zero (i.e., 
 x e  = 0), the first term in the denominator drops out. This 
special case coincides with Collins-Barry model in which farmers are assumed to face a constant cost of 
debt and have full access to credit. Note that the optimal leverage ratio is an increasing function of   u and 
p and a decreasing function of , ˃τ
2, which is consistent with Collins-Barry’s conclusion.. But in our 
generalized model, we observe that the effects are changing with the leverage level.  
A result of special interest concerns the effect of the growth index,   u , an indicator of farms’ growth 
potential. The result suggests that farms with more growth potential tend to borrow more. The signs of the 12 
 
effect of depreciation, risk attitude, and volatility of the profit index are all consistent with the Collins-
Barry model.   
Further differentiating equations (15) and (16) with respect to leverage suggests that the positive effects 
of the growth index and the depreciation rate diminish with the increase of leverage level, which is 






respect to the leverage does not provide an unambiguous interpretation. 
Different  from  the  Collins-Barry  model,  the  generalized  model  introduced  more  determinants.  Their 
effects on capital structure choice are reflected in the following:  
Assume ? =
[(?1δ+1)?+(?1δ−1) 1−? ??? ]




 19                                                                
??
??𝑖??
=  1 − φ 
𝜙????4
?? ??   ? > 0 
 
 20                                                              
??
??𝑎??
=  1 − φ 
𝜙????2
?? ??   ? > 0 
 
 21                                                               
??
??𝑎?𝑖
=  1 − φ 
𝜙????5
?? ??   ? > 0 
 
 22                                                             
??
?𝑁?𝑖
=  1 − φ 
𝜙????6
?? ??   ? > 0 
 
 23                                                          
??
?????
=  1 − φ 
𝜙????7
?? ??   ? < 0 
 
The effects of tangible asset ratio, farm size, family involvement, non-farm income, and organizational 
form depend on the sign of their respective coefficients . In general, the ones that increase the default 
probability would decrease borrowing, such as the effect of farms’ legal form, whereas the ones that 
decrease the default probability would increase the borrowing, which include tangible asset ratio, farm 
size, family involvement, and non-farm income.  
We  further  investigate  the  impact  of  leverage  on  the  effects  displayed  in  (19)  through  (23)  by 
differentiating the expressions with respect to leverage ratio, . Results show that the effects of tangible 13 
 
asset ratio, farm size, family involvement, and non-farm income on capital structure all turn larger on 
farms with higher leverage, whereas the effect of the legal form diminishes from sole proprietorship to 
partnership and to corporations. Because of the conflict of interests between the borrower (stockholders) 
and the lender (bondholders), there exist agency costs of debt. In farms with high leverage, the agency 
cost  of  debt  is  substantially  higher  than  that  of  lower  leveraged  farms.  Large  farms  have  higher 
bankruptcy cost. Consequently, their interests are more aligned with lenders. Therefore, the size effect is 
more prominent at higher levered farms. The tangible asset effect gets higher when leverage increases, 
which suggests lenders get more cautious with lending and put more emphasis on collateral. Likewise, 
when dealing with farms with higher leverage, lenders pay more attention to factors such as family 
involvement and non-farm income that can help reduce the default probability, which means the effect of 
these  factors  would  increase.  However,  when  the  debt  servicing  obligation  decreases  as  from  sole 
proprietorship to corporations, lenders are increasingly unwilling to grant debt when leverage gets higher.  
So far we have shown the theoretical impacts of all attributes (except profitability) on the capital structure 
and the relative importance of the attributes at different ranges of leverage. The analysis becomes more 
complicated. 
We found that the relationship between profitability and leverage is not unambiguous in the model. The 
comparative static relationship is reflected in the following expression:  
 




 ?𝜏 − ?𝜙????3  1 − φ  − [2?0 1 + ? ?𝜏
2 −  1 +  2? ˃iτ]?(1 − φ)
2
?? ??  
 
 
In the literature the relationship between capital structure and profitability has long been under debate, 
with unresolved theoretical controversy, and no clear-cut conclusions have been drawn to date. According 
to the pecking order theory, more profitable firms tend to have less debt as firms prefer internal financing. 
All things being equal, the more profitable farms are, the more internal financial resources they have, and 
therefore one would expect a negative relationship between leverage and profitability. But in the trade-off 
theory framework, an opposite conclusion is expected because expected bankruptcy costs decline when 14 
 
profitability increases and the deductibility of interest payments induces more profitable firms to use more 
debt. In our model, the complicated relationship becomes clear in the comparative static analysis. 
Though the sign is indeterminate, we can see that it has certain correlation with the leverage level. The 
literature  suggests  that,  in  general, the  covariance  of  business  risk  and  financial risk  is  not  strongly 
positive and sometime even negative. For simplicity, assume covariance is zero. Then we can see the sign 
depends  on  the  range  of  leverage.  In  the  numerator  of  (24),  the  negative  effects  of  profitability  on 
leverage rise with leverage, and there exists a cut-off point at which the sign of the whole expression of 
(24) becomes negative. This means at high range of leverage, more profitable firms tend to borrow less, 
which is consistent with the hypothesis that farms with more credit constraint will adhere more closely to 
the pecking order (Barry, Bierlen and Sotomayor, 2000). Below the cut-off point (i.e., when leverage is 
low enough), higher profitability will induce farmers to borrow more in order to reap the benefit of the tax 
shield from interest cost, as the agent costs and the probability of bankruptcy are low. 
 
Empirical Model 
In the empirical work, we propose to use observed variables to proxy unobservable determinants. We use 
two  indicators  to  measure  risk-averse  attribute.  They  are  the  age  of  the  farmer  (Age),  and  farmer’s 
education level (Edu). Generally, older farmers have higher risk aversion. The life circle theory suggests 
that the life circle of farmers parallels the life circle of the family farm. Older farmers generally are in the 
farm  consolidation  or  exit  phase,  in  which  case  they  are  more  conservative  in  management  and 
investment.  Meanwhile,  older  farmer  would  have  stable  relationship  with  banks  and  are  less 
constrained in credit. Lower education level is usually associated with increased risk aversion, which 
may  be  due  to  the  lack  of  the  judgment.  Rosen  et  al.  (2003)  suggest  that  education  increases  the 
willingness to take risk. We use the total asset growth index as the indicator of the growth attribute, the 
standard deviation of the ratio of EBITD over total assets as the indicator of volatility.  
A generalized linear model is specified as follows:   15 
 
(25)                       ?𝑖? = ? +   ??
99
91 ???𝑎?𝑖? + ?1𝐴??𝑖? + ?2???𝑖? + ?3????𝑖? 
                      +?4𝑃??𝑖?−1 + ?5𝑉??𝑖?−1 + ?6???𝑖? + ?7?𝑖??𝑖? + ?8?𝑎??𝑖? 
         +?9?𝑎?𝑖𝑖? + ?10𝑁?𝑖𝑖? + ?11????𝑖? + ?𝑖 + ?𝑖?            
 
where y denotes the ratio of debt to equity; Dyear denotes year dummy, which is used to capture the year-
specific effect; Age denotes the age of farmer; Edu denotes discrete variable of education level (1 for 
primary school, 2 for non-agri education, 3 for vocational education in agriculture, 4 for higher education 
in agriculture), Grow denotes the growth index; Pro denotes the previous EBITD over total assets; Vol is 
the standard deviation of profitability; Dep denotes the ratio of total depreciation to total assets; Size 
denotes the natural logarithm of farm size;, Tang denotes the ratio of fixed assets to total assets; Fami 
denotes number of family members participating in the business; Nfi represents the natural logarithm of 
non-farm income; Form denotes dummy legal status of farm (1 for sole proprietorship, 2 for partnership, 
3 for firm form), and  i  is the farm-specific effect or heterogeneity, and  it e  is disturbance, assumed to 
be identically and independently distributed.   are parameters to be estimated. 
Data 
 
The data used in the application are farm accountancy data (from the Dutch Agricultural Economics 
Research Institute) of cash crop farms in the Netherlands. Panel data are available over the period 1990-
1999 from 450 farms with 2521 observations. Summary statistics of data used in the estimation of model 
(1) are presented in table 1. The mean value of debt-equity ratio is 0.581 and its median is 0.300, which 
shows that the distribution of leverage is positively skewed. The long right tail suggests existence of 
outliers with abnormally high leverage. The average farmers’ age is approximately 49, with minimum age 
22 and maximum 83. In the sample, the majority of farms are sole proprietorship and corporations only 
account for less than 4%. Average family members except farm head hired in the farm are less than 
1 person, which suggests most of farms do not have family involvement. In the sample period, 
average profit rate is  less than 2%, which indicates poor financial performance.  The  average 
growth index is 1.05. If excluding the inflation factor, most farms have the negative growth, which is 




Instead of using ordinary least square estimation, we estimate the econometric model with the conditional 
quantile regression estimator developed by Koenker and Basset (1978). Two reasons motivate use of 
quantile regression. First, quantile regression is robust to non-Gaussian error distribution, especially fat-
tailed situation like the one in our sample. The extreme sensitivity of the least squares estimator to modest 
amounts of outlier contamination makes it a very poor estimator in many non-Gaussian distributions 
(Koenker  and  Basset,  1978).  Relying  on  an  ordered  set  of  sample  observations  and  minimizing  the 
function of absolute residuals, conditional quantile model reduces the impact of the outliers. So it is more 
typical than conditional mean model for asymmetric situation of dependent variable. As we have stated 
before, the sample distribution of leverage ratio is highly skewed with a long tail. The sample coefficients 
of skewness and kurtosis of the variable are 25.5 and 868.6, respectively. Both are significantly different 
from the population values for the normal distribution, 0 and 3, at the 5% confidence level. Second and 
most importantly, unlike OLS, conditional quantile regression traces the entire distribution of dependent 
variable conditional on a set of explanatory variables. It has been recognized that the resulting estimates 
of various effects on the conditional mean are not necessarily indicative of the size and nature of these 
effects  on  different  quantile  of  the  distribution,  such  as  the  lower  tail  (Koenker  and  Basset,  1978). 
Conditional quantile regression can indicate the different effect of covariate on dependent variable under 
its different range. In our theoretical model, we have derived that the effects of determinants on leverage 
ratio change with the magnitude of leverage ratio. Therefore, quantile regression is very appropriate to 
test our theoretical hypotheses.  
In panel data models, treatment of heterogeneity across farms is one of the major concerns. Heterogeneity 
may result from differences in geographical locations, management capabilities, and motivations, etc. The 
individual effect  i   in model (25) renders the ordinary least squares estimator inconsistent if it correlates 
with regressors. Fixed effects estimation allows for correlation between the unobserved effect and the 
observed  explanatory  variables,  and  is  more  robust  than  random effects  estimation.  However,  the 17 
 
robustness comes at a price: we cannot include time-constant factors in explanatory variables. In our 
study, time-constant factors, such that farm’s legal status, are also of our interest. So the traditional within 
estimator or difference estimator is not suitable
5.  
We use Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1982) approach to estimate the quantile regression model. We 
allowed for correlation between  i   and  it z . Rewrite model in (25) as:  
 (26)                    ?𝑖? = ? +   ??
99
91 ???𝑎? + ?1?1𝑖 + ?2?2𝑖? + ?𝑖 + ?𝑖? 
 
where   are time-constant variables and   is time-variant variables, which include Grow, Pro, Dep, 
Size, Tang, and Nfi. 
A Mundlak-Chamberlain approach specifies heterogeneity as a linear function of ? 2𝑖, the mean of ?2𝑖?. 
  
(27)                                 
 
Combining (26) and (27) yields 
 
(28)                   ?𝑖? = ? +   ??
99
91 ???𝑎? + ?1?1𝑖 + ?2?2𝑖? + ? 2𝑖𝜆 + 𝜉𝑖 + ?𝑖? 
 
where  it i it e     is not correlated with i z , but exhibits serial correlation due to  i  . 
In the quantile regression, we use the bootstrap method to estimate the covariance matrix of the parameter 














th quantiles, using the same list of explanatory variables for each of these quantiles. 
F-values  for  all  coefficients  of   in  the  estimate  show  that  the  correlation  of  heterogeneity  and 
regressors cannot be rejected at 5% significant level.  
                                                 
5 Although time-constant variables cannot be included by themselves in the fixed effects model, one can interact them with 
variables that change over time – for example with time period dummy variables. Doing so will estimate how the partial effect of 
that variable changes over time. Since the model is involved in many time-constant variables, this way of identifying the effect of 
time-constant variables is not adopted.  18 
 
As a proxy for risk aversion, education has a significant, positive effect on leverage only at low quantile 
of the distribution, and the effect increases, but is insignificant when moving up to higher leverage level, 
suggesting that the empirical result is consistent with the theoretical inference. Age has a significant, 
negative coefficient throughout the distribution. The magnitude increases when moving up the leverage 
range.  
As expected, the growth potential has a significant, positive coefficient across most of the distribution. 
However, the size of the coefficient increases (rather than decreases) with the leverage. The increasing 
positive effect may arise from its effect on default probability.  
The profitability has no effect at low level of leverage, and it becomes negative and significant at the 
medium  and  high  quantiles  of  the  distribution  (Figure  2  in  Appendix).  Furthermore,  the  effect 
substantially magnifies. It verifies our theoretical inference about the effect of profitability on leverage: 
farmers with higher leverage prefer internal financing, providing support for the pecking order theory. At 
the highest quantiles of the distribution, leverage ratio is very sensitive to profitability. The coefficients of 
previous profitability are -1.3 on the 90
th quantile. Generally, farmers with such high leverage have been 
blocked  out the  credit  market  and  issuing  more  debt  is  not feasible.  Income  generated  by  operation 
becomes the only source of financing.  
The effects of depreciation rate are mixed and insignificant over the majority of the distribution. We find 
the effect of farm size is positive for farms in the lower and upper ranges of the leverage, which is 
consistent with the view that larger size reduces default probability. We also find the effect of farm size 
on leverage is increasing when moving up the leverage, which is also expected.  
The impacts of tangible assets on the farm’s capital structure choice vary in size and significance as 
leverage moves up. The effect is positive and significant at the low and medium quantiles, but the effect 
decreases and becomes insignificant, and then the sign becomes negative at the highest quantile. This may 
suggest that as farms become highly leveraged, they are no longer able to borrow by collateralizing fixed 
assets. This is consistent with the argument by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) that there is an adverse selection 19 
 
effect in which case the collateral no longer provides credible security for lenders, because borrowers are 
seeking riskier strategies. 
Non-farm income has no significant effect on leverage at all quantiles of the distribution, even though the 
sign is largely consistent with the expectation. The effect of legal status of farms on leverage is negative 
only in the low range of the leverage distribution and has the expected sign. Family involvement has a 
significant positive effect, but only in low ranges of leverage.  
The estimated coefficients on time dummies suggest insignificant effects of macroeconomic variables. 
The results from this study do not provide support for the effect of volatility on leverage, presumably due 
to the fact that data used are from single-industry, specialized operation where business risk does not have 
sufficient variation.  
 
Conclusions 
This study proposed a theoretical framework for analyzing farm capital structure choice. The theoretical 
model recognizes that the costs of debt are endogenously determined which in turn reflect the degree of 
credit  constraint  faced  by  individual  borrowers.  Based  on the theoretical framework,  we  derived the 
impacts of different factors on capital structure choice analytically. The theoretical results further suggest 
that the potential determinants of capital structure have differing effects at different ranges of leverage. 
The determinants analyzed include farmers’ risk attitude, growth potential, profitability, volatility, farm 
size, the age of farmers, tangible assets, family involvement, non-farm income, and legal status of farms.  
Methodologically, we proposed a fixed-effect quantile regression procedure to estimate the impacts of 
different determinants at different ranges of leverage. The theoretical inferences are tested with empirical 
data and the results are analyzed. We found that risk attitude, grow potential, farm size have significant 
effects on farm capital structure choice at almost all leverage levels, while tangible assets, profitability, 
the  legal  form,  and  family  involvement  only  exhibits  influences  over  certain  ranges.  In  particular, 20 
 
profitability negatively impacts leverage in high levels of leverage, suggesting the pecking order theory 
dominates the trade-off theory. Most of the empirical evidence found in this study is consistent with the 
theoretical model. However, our empirical results do not provide support for the effect of volatility due to 
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Table 1. Summary statistics of Dutch Arable Farms 1990-99 
 
  Unit  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Leverage  Ratio  0.581  1.923  0.000  76.027 
Age  Years  48.612  10.427  22.000  83.000 
Edu  Dummy  2.309  0.608  1.000  4.000 
Grow  Ratio  1.050  0.242  0.474  6.898 
Pro  Ratio  0.013  0.100  -1.716  0.395 
Vol  Standard deviation  0.037  0.039  0.000  0.674 
Dep  Ratio  0.034  0.021  0.001  0.170 
Size  The nature logarithm  4.401  0.640  2.659  6.270 
Tang  Ratio  0.663  0.185  0.032  0.956 
Fami  Integer  0.628  0.868  0.000  10.000 
Nfi  The nature logarithm  10.083  1.009  2.485  12.686 





























Table 2. Results from Quantile Regression 
 
   10th quantile  20th quantile  30th quantile 
Var.  Coe.  p-value  Coe.  p-value     Coe.  p-value 
Age  -0.001***  0.001  -0.004***  0.000  -0.005***  0.000 
Form  -0.026***  0.000  -0.022***  0.009  -0.019  0.185 
Edu  0.007*  0.069  0.011*  0.053  0.010  0.187 
Fami  0.005  0.277  0.012*  0.058  0.019***  0.006 
Nfi  0.001  0.926  0.002  0.893  0.007  0.671 
Grow  0.070  0.161  0.078*  0.069  0.076  0.356 
Size  0.031***  0.003  0.032**  0.041  0.027  0.143 
Tang  0.209***  0.001  0.331***  0.000  0.350***  0.000 
Vol  -0.086  0.383  -0.329  0.106  -0.299  0.304 
Dep  -0.852  0.126  -1.043  0.181  -1.780  0.192 
Pro  -0.150  0.143  -0.151  0.149  -0.284**  0.044 
d91  -0.002  0.893  0.001  0.936  0.001  0.944 
d92  -0.004  0.779  -0.004  0.852  -0.016  0.425 
d93  0.004  0.761  -0.004  0.850  -0.015  0.509 
d94  0.011  0.359  0.015  0.514  0.011  0.596 
d95  0.002  0.920  -0.015  0.465  -0.024  0.261 
d96  0.006  0.570  -0.006  0.747  -0.020  0.375 
d97  0.010  0.263  0.011  0.591  -0.002  0.935 
d98  0.010  0.487  0.003  0.894  -0.010  0.648 
d99  0.002  0.838  -0.011  0.635  -0.024  0.217 
anfi  0.002  0.850  0.007  0.713  0.001  0.946 
agrow  0.034  0.532  0.094  0.286  0.147***  0.008 
asize  0.000  0.629  0.000  0.291  0.000  0.108 
atang  -0.068  0.327  -0.059  0.485  -0.044  0.594 
apro  -0.097  0.593  -0.301**  0.044  -0.169  0.452 
adep  1.523***  0.004  2.819***  0.003  4.349***  0.007 
















   40th quantile  50th quantile  60th quantile 
Var.  Coe.  p-value  Coe.  p-value  Coe.  p-value 
Age  -0.006***  0.000  -0.009***  0.000  -0.011***  0.000 
Form  -0.033**  0.041  -0.046**  0.029  -0.037  0.209 
Edu  0.009  0.329  0.006  0.555  0.009  0.550 
Fami  0.022***  0.010  0.012  0.339  0.011  0.405 
Nfi  -0.011  0.602  0.006  0.799  -0.017  0.587 
Grow  0.274***  0.009  0.324***  0.000  0.446***  0.000 
Size  0.039  0.202  0.037  0.175  0.106***  0.000 
Tang  0.332***  0.005  0.318**  0.038  0.279  0.132 
Vol  -0.393  0.354  -0.144  0.720  0.005  0.993 
Dep  -4.467**  0.036  -4.508**  0.026  -3.387  0.213 
Pro  -0.607***  0.004  -0.843***  0.003  -1.391***  0.000 
d91  -0.001  0.958  -0.005  0.824  -0.004  0.856 
d92  -0.014  0.623  -0.002  0.956  -0.011  0.691 
d93  0.005  0.877  0.040  0.214  0.007  0.856 
d94  0.022  0.495  0.052*  0.077  0.041  0.262 
d95  -0.026  0.419  -0.001  0.977  -0.016  0.619 
d96  -0.015  0.607  0.009  0.793  0.004  0.924 
d97  0.001  0.974  0.036  0.353  0.039  0.237 
d98  -0.014  0.672  0.003  0.917  0.012  0.767 
d99  -0.023  0.401  0.004  0.887  -0.018  0.502 
anfi  0.027  0.283  0.007  0.810  0.039  0.244 
agrow  0.105  0.336  0.124  0.286  0.026  0.863 
asize  0.001**  0.085  0.001**  0.012  0.001**  0.048 
atang  0.037  0.782  0.048  0.775  0.063  0.749 
apro  -0.095  0.780  -0.033  0.944  0.316  0.460 
adep  8.423***  0.001  8.798***  0.000  8.486***  0.002 

















   70th quantile  80th quantile  90th quantile 
Var.  Coe.  p-value  Coe.  p-value  Coe.  p-value 
Age  -0.014***  0.000  -0.013***  0.000  -0.019***  0.000 
Form  -0.031  0.259  -0.015  0.695  0.060  0.419 
Edu  0.002  0.902  0.020  0.406  0.026  0.654 
Fami  0.002  0.882  0.005  0.717  -0.053  0.159 
Nfi  -0.006  0.820  0.013  0.718  0.134  0.193 
Grow  0.531***  0.000  0.559***  0.000  0.830***  0.002 
Size  0.139***  0.000  0.122**  0.023  0.303**  0.022 
Tang  0.185  0.445  0.054  0.906  -0.236  0.788 
Vol  0.123  0.868  1.016  0.394  3.809*  0.094 
Dep  0.327  0.942  4.820  0.400  24.970**  0.020 
Pro  -1.573***  0.000  -1.287**  0.011  -1.837  0.323 
d91  -0.025  0.500  -0.014  0.781  -0.027  0.853 
d92  0.003  0.957  0.036  0.665  0.109  0.604 
d93  0.002  0.948  -0.038  0.590  -0.013  0.958 
d94  0.023  0.623  -0.050  0.470  0.066  0.721 
d95  -0.034  0.502  -0.038  0.565  0.015  0.942 
d96  0.003  0.953  0.001  0.994  -0.012  0.948 
d97  0.040  0.344  0.046  0.395  0.026  0.897 
d98  0.003  0.956  -0.035  0.456  -0.035  0.832 
d99  -0.015  0.656  -0.033  0.569  0.019  0.920 
anfi  0.060**  0.042  0.083**  0.034  0.018  0.877 
agrow  0.148  0.302  0.134  0.528  -0.312  0.594 
asize  0.000  0.262  0.000  0.531  -0.001  0.220 
atang  0.165  0.529  0.297  0.542  0.301  0.740 
apro  -0.022  0.963  0.067  0.909  0.195  0.917 
adep  6.550  0.178  6.874  0.257  -9.371  0.359 
_cons  -1.084***  0.000  -1.547***  0.000  -1.980**  0.028 
 













Figure 1. Interest Rate Faced by Farmers 
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